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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-4233
________________
STACY ANN PATTERSON,
Appellant
v.
PA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-02549)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 2, 2007
BEFORE: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed June 15, 2007)
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Stacy Ann Patterson filed a civil complaint in United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in which she claimed that her employer, the
Pennsylvania Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), discriminated against her, by denying

her training, in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 951-963. Patterson was hired on January 18, 2000 as an Information
Technology Technician. Because the original filing did not state a basis for federal
jurisdiction, the OIG filed a motion for a more definite statement, asking Patterson to
clarify whether her claim of discrimination was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, the PHRA, Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., or some other law.
The motion was granted and Patterson was directed to file an amended complaint.
She then filed an item consisting of 196 numbered paragraphs, App. 33-51, which we will
refer to as the amended complaint, in which she indicated at ¶¶ 186-88 and 191 that she
was discriminated against in violation of § 5 of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act on
account of her perceived disabilities of Hydrocephalus, Epilepsy, and Post-Concussion
Syndrome. At ¶¶ 121-23, Patterson described a sexual relationship with her supervisor,
and at ¶ 136, she stated that he had threatened to discipline her for unsatisfactory
performance, but there was no mention of Title VII itself.
The OIG moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis of the Eleventh
Amendment, a motion which Patterson opposed in writing. Her written opposition did
not, however, address the OIG’s immunity argument. In an order entered on August 23,
2006, the Magistrate Judge dismissed the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), reasoning that a suit against the OIG for violating the state Human
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Relations Act was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.1 Patterson appeals.
We will affirm. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our
standard of review is plenary. See Gould Elec., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176
(3d Cir. 2000). The Eleventh Amendment precludes suits against a state in federal court
by citizens of that state or other states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98 (1984). A state may consent to a suit against it in federal court and thereby
waive its immunity, but Pennsylvania has not done so, having specifically withheld
consent, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b). Therefore, Patterson’s suit against the OIG
under the state Human Relations Act may only be brought in state court. See Mansfield
State College v. Kovich, 407 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979).
Patterson has argued in her brief on appeal that Congress abrogated the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity in passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and that the
Magistrate Judge should have allowed her to amend her complaint to “more fully explain
the discriminatory pattern due to her gender and perceived disability.” (Appellant’s Brief,
at 25.) However, a suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act would also
have been barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). In addition, although it is true that Congress
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in passing Title VII, see Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), Patterson was not prevented from amending her
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The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
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complaint as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (“A party may amend
the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served.”), in response to the OIG’s motion to dismiss if it was in fact her intention to
pursue a Title VII claim for gender discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), based on
an incident or incidents of sexual harassment.
We will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing the amended complaint.
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